- metadata.enrich (propose, low, replay safe): normalized-title cache (kv_cache
region enrich, 7 days) -> daily budget -> web.search (title + 短剧 / 电视剧 平台,
second query limited to whitelist via site:) -> web.fetch of up to 3 relevant
whitelisted pages (registered site domains never read, redirects out of the
whitelist dropped) -> upstream model extraction with rule fallback -> server-side
evidence check (rule_confirmed / multi_evidence / needs_review). Suggestion only.
- POST /identity-pool/{id}/enrich (suggest) and /enrich/apply (console session):
provisional entity or same-title merge, season/episode units, field-level
metadata with source web/agent + evidence, aliases, release assignment.
Poster proxy GET /img/enrich/{id} (og:image from whitelisted pages only).
- Auto-enrich once per pool entry when subscription/rule lookups find nothing on
TMDB (identity.autoEnrich, off by default); identity.enrichDailyBudget,
identity.enrichDomains settings; web.fetch now returns og:image.
- Pool sheet "元数据补全" section; entity detail shows evidence links.
- Migration 0049_enrichment (metadata_enrichment, metadata_field.evidence, source
web). Requires image rebuild / api + worker restart to take effect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- POST /pi/upstreams/{id}/models/refresh calls the provider's model list
endpoint (OpenAI-shaped /models, Anthropic /v1/models, Google
/v1beta/models, OpenRouter /api/v1/models; Radius via pi-ai refresh),
normalizes {id, displayName, contextWindow, supportsVision,
supportsTools, pricing} and stores it in pi_upstream.models (0044)
- GET .../models returns {source, fetchedAt, models[]}: remote merged
with the static catalog (remote first); failures (401/network/
unsupported) fall back to static with a one-line error
- POST /pi/models/probe for trying credentials before creating
- wizard and edit drawer: fetch button, searchable dropdown with
vision/tool tags, manual id, source line; default upstream needs a model
- tests: mock /models, 401, network failure; smoke step; runbook
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- GET /auth/totp/setup returns the pending secret and otpauth URL (created
on first call, reused on refresh) for the console to render as a QR code.
- Enabling TOTP issues 8 one-time recovery codes (argon2id hashes in
admin_recovery_code); login accepts recoveryCode in place of totpCode,
disable accepts either, and recovery_codes regenerates with the password.
- Passkeys via @simplewebauthn/server: register/list/rename/delete under
the console session, public login options/verify that reuse the login
rate limit and session cookies. Challenges are one-time rows in
webauthn_challenge; RP ID and origins come from WEBAUTHN_RP_ID /
WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS, falling back to the request host. Signature counter
regressions are rejected. SessionInfo gains passkeyEnabled.
- --role rotate-master-key re-encrypts the secret table from
SECRET_MASTER_KEY to SECRET_MASTER_KEY_NEW one row per transaction,
skips rows already on the new key (resumable, swap keys to roll back),
logs progress and audits secret.master_key_rotate. Secrets now record
the master key fingerprint in kdf_params.kid.
- Runbook: recovery codes, passkey configuration, rotation steps and
rollback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- modules/schedules: registerScheduledJob({key, defaults, run}) registry; defaults are
synced into scheduled_job without overriding user-changed enabled/schedule
- scheduler runs only on the io worker, one instance via pg_try_advisory_lock held on a
dedicated connection; due = enabled and next_run_at reached, or run requested;
jobs run in parallel, never re-entrant; interval next = finish + period, cron next match;
run-now does not move next_run_at and merges duplicate requests; skip advances one period;
history trimmed to the last 50 runs; interrupted runs marked failed on takeover
- agent_check jobs: trigger condition checked first, goal template rendered, runAgent
enqueued via startRun(trigger=schedule) with allowlist and budget, one run per time slot;
allowRecover uses the autoInvestigate grant check; results harvested back into the run
history and optionally reported as an info decision; 3 built-in checks, off by default
- sources-identity (feeds.poll, sites.snapshot, identity.review), acquisition-organize
(downloads.sync, cache.threshold, downloads.orchestrate, slots.reevaluate,
subscriptions.search, subscriptions.metadata, library.reconcile) and file-manager
(trash.purge) register jobs instead of running their own setInterval; default
intervals unchanged; backup registered as an unconfigured placeholder
- endpoints under /schedules (admin, console session only)
TODO: pi refreshPiTokens and auth-settings session cleanup still own their timers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- /pi/providers, /pi/upstreams CRUD, test (auth-only by default, no cost), models
- subscription login via pi models.login with a suspended interaction: browser mode
waits for the pasted redirect URL, device mode polls server-side; per-provider
login lock, readable callback-port-in-use errors
- credential store locks the pi_upstream row (select for update) so api and worker
refreshes never double-write a rotated refresh token
- refreshPiTokens task: refresh before expiry; failure marks expired and opens a
relogin decision, closed again after a successful login
- runAgent picks upstreamId > agent_run.upstream_id > default upstream > legacy
settings; credentials injected by the server, never logged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
S-1 (/files/move, /files/organize action=move):
- organize-guard: authorizeMoveEntities checks every source's media entities
(declared entity plus entities of registered assets under the source);
one-time approval still covers the whole request; any source that cannot
be attributed to an entity only passes with an approval; denial lists every
unauthorized item; optional non-consuming pre-check
- transfer: entities per source (directory = registered assets beneath it)
- organize: all move groups pre-checked before any group executes; any
denial -> whole request 403 approval_required
S-2:
- api.ts: GET /files/download and POST /files/trash/purge marked
auth:"session"; files routes attach requireAdminSession from the registry
annotation; handler-side purge check removed, download keeps a same-rule
defense check; permanent delete uses isAdminSession
- DEV key rule written down: equals an admin-scope key for session-only
endpoints, still admin for Move/delete approval bypass (as authorizeMove)
- api-registry.test: session list updated; new reverse assertion that no
non-session endpoint answers 403 to an admin-scope bearer
S-5 (trash restore):
- restore-to requires a writable managed library root (isWritableTarget)
- in-place restore rebuilds missing parents level by level without
following symlinks (mkdirWithin), realpath-checked per level
- cross-volume restore capped by FILES_TRASH_CROSS_MAX_BYTES; cross-volume
copies (trash in / restore out) go through fsproxy
Tests: multi-entity move 403 + listing, unattributed source, organize foreign
asset 403, download/purge 403 for DEV and admin-scope keys, restore target
not writable, symlinked parent, rebuild parents, cross-volume cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- POST /approvals and PATCH /approvals/{id} require a console admin session
(EndpointDef auth:"session"); API keys incl. admin scope get 403, so an
organize.execute key can no longer approve its own plan (S1)
- tests for single-use approval checks: expired, revision/payload hash
mismatch, consumed, revoked, pending/rejected, plan mismatch; re-approve
after plan change succeeds once and cannot be replayed (S4)
- one redact key table in @umt/contracts shared by server logger and agent
redactForModel: rsskey, torrent_pass, authkey, downhash, c_secure_pass,
passkey variants, x-api-key, cookie headers, nested objects/arrays (S2)
- TMDB network errors: message and cause redacted via redactUrl (S3)
- web Agent ?mock=1 only in DEV builds or when pi.provider is fake (S7)
- EndpointDef auth annotations for /auth/*, asserted against
PUBLIC_AUTH_PATHS (S10); doc drift fixes (S11)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- Capabilities: all 14 registered (AO: inventory.query, download.plan/submit, organize.plan/execute,
policy.preview/apply; agent: task.inspect/retry/cancel); startup asserts count == 14.
Registry injects server-side authorize (automation_grant by action/scope/policy version/budget,
one-shot approval bound to plan id + payload hash + revision + expiry; model claims ignored;
automation switch), audit_event, server idempotency keys and a capability_invocation op ledger
(migration 0021) used for crash reconciliation. download.plan creates draft plans only;
download.submit promotes draft -> reserved after authorization.
- Agent session API: POST/GET /agent/runs, GET /agent/runs/{id} (events by seq, messages, report),
POST .../messages (wake), POST .../abort; automation-grants, approvals, capabilities invoke, tasks.
- runAgent task: Pi or fake provider from settings (apiKey via secrets), events persisted to
agent_run_event then published, resume + ledger reconciliation when pendingOperations > 0,
waits for goal-linked downloads/imports and reports from business tables (submitted != imported).
- Background triggers: decision.created -> bounded plan_only investigation (dedupe per decision);
decision.updated(resolved) -> resolveDecision executes chosen option.
- W2 closure: all OpenAPI routes registered in contracts api.ts (+ subset test); TMDB key from
settings secret_ref with env fallback; PUT /sites/{id}/credentials documented as alias of
/site-accounts; completion events documented as existing status events.
- e2e (real PG + OpenWorkflow + testkit mocks): RSS->library, agent delegation with grant/deny,
background continuation, worker kill -9 recovery (single qB add), auto investigation dedupe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
