UHD_Media_Tool

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2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
rootandClaude Opus 5.5	f48e1aac96	fix(security): W4-E1 approvals admin-session only, shared redact table, TMDB key redaction, prod mock gate - POST /approvals and PATCH /approvals/{id} require a console admin session (EndpointDef auth:"session"); API keys incl. admin scope get 403, so an organize.execute key can no longer approve its own plan (S1) - tests for single-use approval checks: expired, revision/payload hash mismatch, consumed, revoked, pending/rejected, plan mismatch; re-approve after plan change succeeds once and cannot be replayed (S4) - one redact key table in @umt/contracts shared by server logger and agent redactForModel: rsskey, torrent_pass, authkey, downhash, c_secure_pass, passkey variants, x-api-key, cookie headers, nested objects/arrays (S2) - TMDB network errors: message and cause redacted via redactUrl (S3) - web Agent ?mock=1 only in DEV builds or when pi.provider is fake (S7) - EndpointDef auth annotations for /auth/*, asserted against PUBLIC_AUTH_PATHS (S10); doc drift fixes (S11) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>	2026-09-27 22:24:44 +08:00
rootandClaude Opus 5.5	ff230e5da7	feat(server): W2-A login gate, secrets, settings, instances, audit, engine panel API and PG-backed SSE bus - Admin login gate (docs/design/auth-reference.md): admin_user/admin_session/login_attempt (migration 0015), one-time setup token logged once + conditional UPDATE, argon2id via hash-wasm (WASM; compiled binary has no --allow-ffi), sha256-stored sessions in HttpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie umt_session (fixed 12h TTL, soft revoke), HMAC-derived double-submit CSRF, IP (5) + account (15) failure limits per 15 min, password change revokes other sessions, optional TOTP with replay counter, AuditAction enum. - Unified auth middleware: cookie session or Bearer API key -> c.var.actor {type: admin\|api_key, id, name, scopes}; requireScope works for both; requireAdminSession. - ctx.secrets: AES-256-GCM, per-secret HKDF-SHA256 key from SECRET_MASTER_KEY, AAD bound to (id, purpose); ctx.settings: 30s cache invalidated by settings.changed events. - Endpoints: /auth/*, /settings, /api-keys, /secrets, /audit-events, library-roots, downloader/media-server instances (+test), path-mappings (+verify), PUT /sites/{id}/credentials, /engine/runs\|stats\|cancel (read-only openworkflow schema). - SSE: PgEventBus (sse_event table, migration 0016, LISTEN/NOTIFY umt_events, catch-up by seq, pruning, resync); EventBusPort is now async. - Tests: login/rate limit/revocation/CSRF/TOTP, secrets round trip and no log leakage, admin APIs against mock qB/Emby, SSE across two Deno subprocesses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>	2026-09-27 19:59:54 +08:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

rootandClaude Opus 5.5

f48e1aac96

fix(security): W4-E1 approvals admin-session only, shared redact table, TMDB key redaction, prod mock gate

- POST /approvals and PATCH /approvals/{id} require a console admin session
  (EndpointDef auth:"session"); API keys incl. admin scope get 403, so an
  organize.execute key can no longer approve its own plan (S1)
- tests for single-use approval checks: expired, revision/payload hash
  mismatch, consumed, revoked, pending/rejected, plan mismatch; re-approve
  after plan change succeeds once and cannot be replayed (S4)
- one redact key table in @umt/contracts shared by server logger and agent
  redactForModel: rsskey, torrent_pass, authkey, downhash, c_secure_pass,
  passkey variants, x-api-key, cookie headers, nested objects/arrays (S2)
- TMDB network errors: message and cause redacted via redactUrl (S3)
- web Agent ?mock=1 only in DEV builds or when pi.provider is fake (S7)
- EndpointDef auth annotations for /auth/*, asserted against
  PUBLIC_AUTH_PATHS (S10); doc drift fixes (S11)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

2026-09-27 22:24:44 +08:00

rootandClaude Opus 5.5

ff230e5da7

feat(server): W2-A login gate, secrets, settings, instances, audit, engine panel API and PG-backed SSE bus

- Admin login gate (docs/design/auth-reference.md): admin_user/admin_session/login_attempt
  (migration 0015), one-time setup token logged once + conditional UPDATE, argon2id via
  hash-wasm (WASM; compiled binary has no --allow-ffi), sha256-stored sessions in HttpOnly
  SameSite=Lax cookie umt_session (fixed 12h TTL, soft revoke), HMAC-derived double-submit
  CSRF, IP (5) + account (15) failure limits per 15 min, password change revokes other
  sessions, optional TOTP with replay counter, AuditAction enum.
- Unified auth middleware: cookie session or Bearer API key -> c.var.actor
  {type: admin|api_key, id, name, scopes}; requireScope works for both; requireAdminSession.
- ctx.secrets: AES-256-GCM, per-secret HKDF-SHA256 key from SECRET_MASTER_KEY, AAD bound
  to (id, purpose); ctx.settings: 30s cache invalidated by settings.changed events.
- Endpoints: /auth/*, /settings, /api-keys, /secrets, /audit-events, library-roots,
  downloader/media-server instances (+test), path-mappings (+verify),
  PUT /sites/{id}/credentials, /engine/runs|stats|cancel (read-only openworkflow schema).
- SSE: PgEventBus (sse_event table, migration 0016, LISTEN/NOTIFY umt_events, catch-up by
  seq, pruning, resync); EventBusPort is now async.
- Tests: login/rate limit/revocation/CSRF/TOTP, secrets round trip and no log leakage,
  admin APIs against mock qB/Emby, SSE across two Deno subprocesses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

2026-09-27 19:59:54 +08:00