Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
rootandClaude Opus 5.5 b0e5d539ed feat(auth): TOTP setup endpoint, recovery codes, passkeys and master key rotation
- GET /auth/totp/setup returns the pending secret and otpauth URL (created
  on first call, reused on refresh) for the console to render as a QR code.
- Enabling TOTP issues 8 one-time recovery codes (argon2id hashes in
  admin_recovery_code); login accepts recoveryCode in place of totpCode,
  disable accepts either, and recovery_codes regenerates with the password.
- Passkeys via @simplewebauthn/server: register/list/rename/delete under
  the console session, public login options/verify that reuse the login
  rate limit and session cookies. Challenges are one-time rows in
  webauthn_challenge; RP ID and origins come from WEBAUTHN_RP_ID /
  WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS, falling back to the request host. Signature counter
  regressions are rejected. SessionInfo gains passkeyEnabled.
- --role rotate-master-key re-encrypts the secret table from
  SECRET_MASTER_KEY to SECRET_MASTER_KEY_NEW one row per transaction,
  skips rows already on the new key (resumable, swap keys to roll back),
  logs progress and audits secret.master_key_rotate. Secrets now record
  the master key fingerprint in kdf_params.kid.
- Runbook: recovery codes, passkey configuration, rotation steps and
  rollback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-28 20:22:07 +08:00
rootandClaude Opus 5.5 f48e1aac96 fix(security): W4-E1 approvals admin-session only, shared redact table, TMDB key redaction, prod mock gate
- POST /approvals and PATCH /approvals/{id} require a console admin session
  (EndpointDef auth:"session"); API keys incl. admin scope get 403, so an
  organize.execute key can no longer approve its own plan (S1)
- tests for single-use approval checks: expired, revision/payload hash
  mismatch, consumed, revoked, pending/rejected, plan mismatch; re-approve
  after plan change succeeds once and cannot be replayed (S4)
- one redact key table in @umt/contracts shared by server logger and agent
  redactForModel: rsskey, torrent_pass, authkey, downhash, c_secure_pass,
  passkey variants, x-api-key, cookie headers, nested objects/arrays (S2)
- TMDB network errors: message and cause redacted via redactUrl (S3)
- web Agent ?mock=1 only in DEV builds or when pi.provider is fake (S7)
- EndpointDef auth annotations for /auth/*, asserted against
  PUBLIC_AUTH_PATHS (S10); doc drift fixes (S11)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-27 22:24:44 +08:00
rootandClaude Opus 5.5 1023642ef9 feat(web): W4-A wire console to real endpoints
- Agent page uses contracts (AgentRun/AgentRunDetail/AgentGoalReport) instead of a local
  mirror; ?mock=1 stays as an explicit demo switch; run snapshot refreshes on agent.run_status;
  stream auto-follow only while the user stays near the bottom (abort stays reachable)
- settings: Pi provider select incl. fake, new Agent runtime card (budgets, fakeScript)
- download trace uses /tasks?subjectId= and /organization-records?downloadTaskId= instead of
  time-window engine run matching and path matching; new business-task tab with cancel/retry
- workbench download dialog posts /acquisition-plans and shows per-slot rejection reasons
- preference tag revision history; subscription search by title/kind; identity/alias/subscription
  lists show entity titles; slot cards show current asset summary; policy preview sample titles
- DecisionSummary / IdentityRevisionList / ReleaseIdentityResult / TaskAccepted / PolicyPreviewSummary /
  OrganizePlanArtifactContent taken from contracts
- docs: SSE for console (cookie) vs GET /events?after=&limit= JSON replay for API keys

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-27 21:32:11 +08:00
rootandClaude Opus 5.5 6280d52ec3 feat(server): W2-D agent assembly, session API, runAgent/resolveDecision and backend e2e
- Capabilities: all 14 registered (AO: inventory.query, download.plan/submit, organize.plan/execute,
  policy.preview/apply; agent: task.inspect/retry/cancel); startup asserts count == 14.
  Registry injects server-side authorize (automation_grant by action/scope/policy version/budget,
  one-shot approval bound to plan id + payload hash + revision + expiry; model claims ignored;
  automation switch), audit_event, server idempotency keys and a capability_invocation op ledger
  (migration 0021) used for crash reconciliation. download.plan creates draft plans only;
  download.submit promotes draft -> reserved after authorization.
- Agent session API: POST/GET /agent/runs, GET /agent/runs/{id} (events by seq, messages, report),
  POST .../messages (wake), POST .../abort; automation-grants, approvals, capabilities invoke, tasks.
- runAgent task: Pi or fake provider from settings (apiKey via secrets), events persisted to
  agent_run_event then published, resume + ledger reconciliation when pendingOperations > 0,
  waits for goal-linked downloads/imports and reports from business tables (submitted != imported).
- Background triggers: decision.created -> bounded plan_only investigation (dedupe per decision);
  decision.updated(resolved) -> resolveDecision executes chosen option.
- W2 closure: all OpenAPI routes registered in contracts api.ts (+ subset test); TMDB key from
  settings secret_ref with env fallback; PUT /sites/{id}/credentials documented as alias of
  /site-accounts; completion events documented as existing status events.
- e2e (real PG + OpenWorkflow + testkit mocks): RSS->library, agent delegation with grant/deny,
  background continuation, worker kill -9 recovery (single qB add), auto investigation dedupe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-27 20:52:12 +08:00
rootandClaude Opus 5.5 ff230e5da7 feat(server): W2-A login gate, secrets, settings, instances, audit, engine panel API and PG-backed SSE bus
- Admin login gate (docs/design/auth-reference.md): admin_user/admin_session/login_attempt
  (migration 0015), one-time setup token logged once + conditional UPDATE, argon2id via
  hash-wasm (WASM; compiled binary has no --allow-ffi), sha256-stored sessions in HttpOnly
  SameSite=Lax cookie umt_session (fixed 12h TTL, soft revoke), HMAC-derived double-submit
  CSRF, IP (5) + account (15) failure limits per 15 min, password change revokes other
  sessions, optional TOTP with replay counter, AuditAction enum.
- Unified auth middleware: cookie session or Bearer API key -> c.var.actor
  {type: admin|api_key, id, name, scopes}; requireScope works for both; requireAdminSession.
- ctx.secrets: AES-256-GCM, per-secret HKDF-SHA256 key from SECRET_MASTER_KEY, AAD bound
  to (id, purpose); ctx.settings: 30s cache invalidated by settings.changed events.
- Endpoints: /auth/*, /settings, /api-keys, /secrets, /audit-events, library-roots,
  downloader/media-server instances (+test), path-mappings (+verify),
  PUT /sites/{id}/credentials, /engine/runs|stats|cancel (read-only openworkflow schema).
- SSE: PgEventBus (sse_event table, migration 0016, LISTEN/NOTIFY umt_events, catch-up by
  seq, pruning, resync); EventBusPort is now async.
- Tests: login/rate limit/revocation/CSRF/TOTP, secrets round trip and no log leakage,
  admin APIs against mock qB/Emby, SSE across two Deno subprocesses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-27 19:59:54 +08:00