feat(auth): TOTP setup endpoint, recovery codes, passkeys and master key rotation

- GET /auth/totp/setup returns the pending secret and otpauth URL (created
  on first call, reused on refresh) for the console to render as a QR code.
- Enabling TOTP issues 8 one-time recovery codes (argon2id hashes in
  admin_recovery_code); login accepts recoveryCode in place of totpCode,
  disable accepts either, and recovery_codes regenerates with the password.
- Passkeys via @simplewebauthn/server: register/list/rename/delete under
  the console session, public login options/verify that reuse the login
  rate limit and session cookies. Challenges are one-time rows in
  webauthn_challenge; RP ID and origins come from WEBAUTHN_RP_ID /
  WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS, falling back to the request host. Signature counter
  regressions are rejected. SessionInfo gains passkeyEnabled.
- --role rotate-master-key re-encrypts the secret table from
  SECRET_MASTER_KEY to SECRET_MASTER_KEY_NEW one row per transaction,
  skips rows already on the new key (resumable, swap keys to roll back),
  logs progress and audits secret.master_key_rotate. Secrets now record
  the master key fingerprint in kdf_params.kid.
- Runbook: recovery codes, passkey configuration, rotation steps and
  rollback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

apps/server/src/modules/agent/runner.ts

@@ -507,7 +507,10 @@ export async function goalSettled(env: AgentEnv, runId: string, modelText: strin
     .set({ status: "waiting", summary: r.summary })
     .where("id", "=", runId)
     .where("status", "in", ["running", "waiting"])
-    .returning(["parent_run_id", sql<boolean>`(select status = 'running' from agent_run o where o.id = ${runId})`.as("was_running")])
+    .returning([
+      "parent_run_id",
+      sql<boolean>`(select status = 'running' from agent_run o where o.id = ${runId})`.as("was_running"),
+    ])
     .executeTakeFirst();
   // 子会话刚转 waiting(对父会话来说已有结果):唤醒挂起等待的父会话
   if (u?.parent_run_id && u.was_running) await wakeParent(env.ctx, runId);

apps/server/src/modules/auth-settings/auth-routes.ts

@@ -6,20 +6,36 @@ import { ApiException } from "../../http/errors.ts";
 import type { ModuleApp, ServerContext } from "../types.ts";
 import {
   adminActor,
+  assertNotRateLimited,
   type CreatedSession,
   changePassword,
   createSession,
   loadAdmin,
+  recordAttempt,
   revokeSession,
   sessionInfo,
   setupAdmin,
   totpBegin,
   totpDisable,
   totpEnable,
+  totpRegenerateRecoveryCodes,
+  totpSetup,
   totpStatus,
   verifyLogin,
 } from "./auth-service.ts";
 import { audit, type Def, endpoint } from "./endpoint.ts";
+import {
+  authenticationOptions,
+  deletePasskey,
+  listPasskeys,
+  type RpInfo,
+  registrationOptions,
+  renamePasskey,
+  resolveRp,
+  toPasskeyInfo,
+  verifyAuthentication,
+  verifyRegistration,
+} from "./passkey.ts";
 
 // 登录门禁端点:/auth/setup、/auth/login、/auth/session 免鉴权(见 http/auth.ts PUBLIC_AUTH_PATHS),
 // 其余需要已登录;改密与 TOTP 只接受控制台 cookie 会话。
@@ -36,8 +52,19 @@ const D = {
   password: { ...Api.auth.password, tags },
   totpGet: { ...Api.auth.totpStatus, tags },
   totpPost: { ...Api.auth.totp, tags },
+  totpSetup: { ...Api.auth.totpSetup, tags },
+  passkeys: { ...Api.auth.passkeys, tags },
+  passkeyRegisterOptions: { ...Api.auth.passkeyRegisterOptions, tags },
+  passkeyRegister: { ...Api.auth.passkeyRegister, tags },
+  passkeyRename: { ...Api.auth.passkeyRename, tags },
+  passkeyDelete: { ...Api.auth.passkeyDelete, tags },
+  passkeyLoginOptions: { ...Api.auth.passkeyLoginOptions, tags },
+  passkeyLogin: { ...Api.auth.passkeyLogin, tags },
 } satisfies Record<string, Def>;
 
+/** Passkey 登录失败 / 限速计数用的账号维度键(免输入用户名) */
+const PASSKEY_ACCOUNT = "(passkey)";
+
 const PRIVATE_IP = /^(127\.|10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|::1$|fc|fd|::ffff:(127|10|192\.168)\.)/i;
 
 /**
@@ -57,6 +84,13 @@ export function clientIp(c: Context<AuthEnv>): string {
   return xri || xff || remote || "unknown";
 }
 
+/** 请求主机(反代后面才信 X-Forwarded-Host),Passkey 未配置 RP ID 时用它 */
+function requestHost(c: Context<AuthEnv>): string | null {
+  const remote = (c.env as { remoteAddr?: { hostname?: string } } | undefined)?.remoteAddr?.hostname;
+  const trusted = !remote || PRIVATE_IP.test(remote);
+  return (trusted ? c.req.header("x-forwarded-host") : undefined) ?? c.req.header("host") ?? new URL(c.req.url).host;
+}
+
 function isHttps(c: Context<AuthEnv>): boolean {
   if (new URL(c.req.url).protocol === "https:") return true;
   const remote = (c.env as { remoteAddr?: { hostname?: string } } | undefined)?.remoteAddr?.hostname;
@@ -106,6 +140,10 @@ export function registerAuthRoutes(app: ModuleApp, ctx: ServerContext) {
     const s = await startSession(c, r.admin.id);
     const actor = adminActor(r.admin);
     await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.login_success", { type: "admin_session", id: s.id }, { ip: clientIp(c) });
+    if (r.secondFactor === "recovery_code") {
+      const left = (await totpStatus(ctx.db, r.admin)).recoveryCodesRemaining;
+      await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.recovery_code_login", { type: "admin_user", id: r.admin.id }, { remaining: left });
+    }
     return { status: "ok" as const, session: await sessionInfo(ctx.db, actor, s.expiresAt) };
   });
 
@@ -146,22 +184,103 @@ export function registerAuthRoutes(app: ModuleApp, ctx: ServerContext) {
     return { revokedSessions: revoked };
   });
 
-  endpoint(app, D.totpGet, async () => totpStatus(await loadAdmin(ctx.db)));
+  endpoint(app, D.totpGet, async () => totpStatus(ctx.db, await loadAdmin(ctx.db)));
 
-  endpoint(app, D.totpPost, async ({ body, actor }) => {
+  const initializedAdmin = async () => {
     const admin = await loadAdmin(ctx.db);
     if (!admin?.password_hash) throw new ApiException("precondition_failed", "管理员尚未初始化");
+    return admin;
+  };
+
+  endpoint(app, D.totpSetup, async () => {
+    const r = await totpSetup(deps(), await initializedAdmin());
+    return { otpauthUri: r.uri, secret: r.secret, issuer: r.issuer, account: r.account };
+  });
+
+  endpoint(app, D.totpPost, async ({ body, actor }) => {
+    const admin = await initializedAdmin();
+    const status = async () => totpStatus(ctx.db, await loadAdmin(ctx.db));
     if (body.action === "begin") {
       const r = await totpBegin(deps(), admin);
-      return { status: totpStatus(await loadAdmin(ctx.db)), otpauthUri: r.uri, secret: r.secret };
+      return { status: await status(), otpauthUri: r.uri, secret: r.secret };
     }
     if (body.action === "enable") {
-      await totpEnable(deps(), admin, body.code);
+      const codes = await totpEnable(deps(), admin, body.code);
       await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.totp_enable", { type: "admin_user", id: admin.id });
-    } else {
-      await totpDisable(deps(), admin, body);
-      await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.totp_disable", { type: "admin_user", id: admin.id });
+      return { status: await status(), recoveryCodes: codes };
     }
-    return { status: totpStatus(await loadAdmin(ctx.db)) };
+    if (body.action === "recovery_codes") {
+      const codes = await totpRegenerateRecoveryCodes(deps(), admin, body);
+      await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.recovery_codes_regenerate", { type: "admin_user", id: admin.id });
+      return { status: await status(), recoveryCodes: codes };
+    }
+    await totpDisable(deps(), admin, body);
+    await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.totp_disable", { type: "admin_user", id: admin.id });
+    return { status: await status() };
+  });
+
+  // ── Passkey ──
+
+  const rp = (c: Context<AuthEnv>): RpInfo => resolveRp(ctx.config ?? {}, requestHost(c));
+
+  endpoint(app, D.passkeys, async ({ c }) => {
+    const session = c.get("session");
+    if (!session) throw new ApiException("forbidden", "只能在控制台登录后操作");
+    return { items: (await listPasskeys(ctx.db, session.adminUserId)).map(toPasskeyInfo) };
+  });
+
+  endpoint(app, D.passkeyRegisterOptions, async ({ c }) =>
+    registrationOptions(ctx.db, await initializedAdmin(), rp(c)),
+  );
+
+  endpoint(
+    app,
+    D.passkeyRegister,
+    async ({ body, c, actor }) => {
+      const admin = await initializedAdmin();
+      const row = await verifyRegistration(ctx.db, admin, rp(c), body);
+      await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.passkey_register", { type: "admin_passkey", id: row.id }, { name: row.name });
+      return toPasskeyInfo(row);
+    },
+    { status: 201 },
+  );
+
+  endpoint(app, D.passkeyRename, async ({ params, body, actor }) => {
+    const admin = await initializedAdmin();
+    const row = await renamePasskey(ctx.db, admin.id, params.id, body.name);
+    await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.passkey_rename", { type: "admin_passkey", id: row.id }, { name: row.name });
+    return toPasskeyInfo(row);
+  });
+
+  endpoint(app, D.passkeyDelete, async ({ params, actor }) => {
+    const admin = await initializedAdmin();
+    const row = await deletePasskey(ctx.db, admin.id, params.id);
+    await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.passkey_remove", { type: "admin_passkey", id: row.id }, { name: row.name });
+    return { ok: true as const };
+  });
+
+  endpoint(app, D.passkeyLoginOptions, async ({ c }) => {
+    await assertNotRateLimited(ctx.db, clientIp(c), PASSKEY_ACCOUNT);
+    return authenticationOptions(ctx.db, await initializedAdmin(), rp(c));
+  });
+
+  // 与密码登录共用限速(IP + "(passkey)" 账号维度)与会话;Passkey 本身是强第一因子,不再要求 TOTP
+  endpoint(app, D.passkeyLogin, async ({ body, c }) => {
+    const ip = clientIp(c);
+    await assertNotRateLimited(ctx.db, ip, PASSKEY_ACCOUNT);
+    const admin = await initializedAdmin();
+    let key: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verifyAuthentication>>;
+    try {
+      key = await verifyAuthentication(ctx.db, admin, rp(c), body);
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof ApiException && (err.code === "unauthorized" || err.code === "bad_request"))
+        await recordAttempt(ctx.db, { ip, username: PASSKEY_ACCOUNT, success: false, reason: "bad_passkey" });
+      throw err;
+    }
+    await recordAttempt(ctx.db, { ip, username: PASSKEY_ACCOUNT, success: true });
+    const s = await startSession(c, admin.id);
+    const actor = adminActor(admin);
+    await audit(ctx, actor, "admin.passkey_login", { type: "admin_session", id: s.id }, { ip, passkeyId: key.id });
+    return { status: "ok" as const, session: await sessionInfo(ctx.db, actor, s.expiresAt) };
   });
 }

apps/server/src/modules/auth-settings/auth-service.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
-import type { Actor, SessionInfo } from "@umt/contracts";
+import { type Actor, RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT, type SessionInfo, type TotpStatus } from "@umt/contracts";
 import { type DB, type Kysely, sql } from "@umt/db";
 import type { Logger } from "pino";
 import { hashSessionToken } from "../../http/auth.ts";
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ import {
 
 // 管理员登录门禁的业务逻辑(照 docs/design/auth-reference.md):
 // setup token 一次性初始化、argon2id、服务端会话(sha256 存库、固定 TTL、软删除吊销)、
-// IP + 账号双维度失败限速(落表)、改密吊销其它会话、可选 TOTP(防重放计数器)。
+// IP + 账号双维度失败限速(落表)、改密吊销其它会话、可选 TOTP(防重放计数器)+ 一次性恢复码(argon2id 哈希存库)。
+// Passkey 见 passkey.ts。
 
 /** 固定会话时长 12 小时,无滑动续期 */
 export const SESSION_TTL_MS = 12 * 3600_000;
@@ -197,11 +198,13 @@ export async function setupAdmin(
   return admin;
 }
 
-export type LoginOutcome = { status: "ok"; admin: AdminRow } | { status: "totp_required" };
+export type LoginOutcome =
+  | { status: "ok"; admin: AdminRow; secondFactor: "none" | "totp" | "recovery_code" }
+  | { status: "totp_required" };
 
 export async function verifyLogin(
   deps: AuthDeps,
-  input: { username: string; password: string; totpCode?: string | undefined },
+  input: { username: string; password: string; totpCode?: string | undefined; recoveryCode?: string | undefined },
   ip: string,
 ): Promise<LoginOutcome> {
   await assertNotRateLimited(deps.db, ip, input.username);
@@ -216,16 +219,87 @@ export async function verifyLogin(
     await recordAttempt(deps.db, { ip, username: input.username, success: false, reason: "bad_password" });
     throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "用户名或密码错误");
   }
+  let secondFactor: "none" | "totp" | "recovery_code" = "none";
   if (admin.totp_enabled_at && admin.totp_secret_ref) {
     // 密码正确但缺第二步:不计失败
-    if (!input.totpCode) return { status: "totp_required" };
-    if (!(await consumeTotp(deps, admin, input.totpCode))) {
-      await recordAttempt(deps.db, { ip, username: input.username, success: false, reason: "bad_totp" });
-      throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "验证码错误");
+    if (!input.totpCode && !input.recoveryCode) return { status: "totp_required" };
+    if (input.totpCode) {
+      if (!(await consumeTotp(deps, admin, input.totpCode))) {
+        await recordAttempt(deps.db, { ip, username: input.username, success: false, reason: "bad_totp" });
+        throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "验证码错误");
+      }
+      secondFactor = "totp";
+    } else {
+      if (!(await consumeRecoveryCode(deps.db, admin.id, input.recoveryCode ?? ""))) {
+        await recordAttempt(deps.db, { ip, username: input.username, success: false, reason: "bad_recovery_code" });
+        throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "恢复码错误或已用过");
+      }
+      secondFactor = "recovery_code";
     }
   }
   await recordAttempt(deps.db, { ip, username: input.username, success: true });
-  return { status: "ok", admin };
+  return { status: "ok", admin, secondFactor };
+}
+
+// ── 恢复码 ──
+
+const RECOVERY_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789";
+
+/** 恢复码归一化:去空格与连字符、转大写(展示为 XXXXX-XXXXX,输入时怎么写都行) */
+export const normalizeRecoveryCode = (code: string) => code.replace(/[\s-]+/g, "").toUpperCase();
+
+function newRecoveryCode(): string {
+  const bytes = randomBytes(10);
+  let out = "";
+  for (const b of bytes) out += RECOVERY_ALPHABET[b % RECOVERY_ALPHABET.length];
+  return `${out.slice(0, 5)}-${out.slice(5)}`;
+}
+
+/** 重新生成恢复码(旧的全部作废);返回明文(只此一次),库里只存 argon2id 哈希 */
+export async function regenerateRecoveryCodes(db: Kysely<DB>, adminUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
+  const codes = Array.from({ length: RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT }, newRecoveryCode);
+  const hashes = await Promise.all(codes.map((c) => hashPassword(normalizeRecoveryCode(c))));
+  await db.transaction().execute(async (trx) => {
+    await trx.deleteFrom("admin_recovery_code").where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId).execute();
+    await trx
+      .insertInto("admin_recovery_code")
+      .values(hashes.map((h) => ({ admin_user_id: adminUserId, code_hash: h })))
+      .execute();
+  });
+  return codes;
+}
+
+/** 校验并作废一个恢复码(条件更新:并发提交同一个码只有一个成功) */
+export async function consumeRecoveryCode(db: Kysely<DB>, adminUserId: string, code: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const norm = normalizeRecoveryCode(code);
+  if (norm.length < 10) return false;
+  const rows = await db
+    .selectFrom("admin_recovery_code")
+    .select(["id", "code_hash"])
+    .where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId)
+    .where("used_at", "is", null)
+    .execute();
+  for (const r of rows) {
+    if (!(await verifyPassword(norm, r.code_hash))) continue;
+    const u = await db
+      .updateTable("admin_recovery_code")
+      .set({ used_at: new Date() })
+      .where("id", "=", r.id)
+      .where("used_at", "is", null)
+      .executeTakeFirst();
+    return Number(u.numUpdatedRows) > 0;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function remainingRecoveryCodes(db: Kysely<DB>, adminUserId: string): Promise<number> {
+  const r = await db
+    .selectFrom("admin_recovery_code")
+    .select(sql<number>`count(*)::int`.as("n"))
+    .where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId)
+    .where("used_at", "is", null)
+    .executeTakeFirst();
+  return r?.n ?? 0;
 }
 
 /** 校验并消费 TOTP 计数器(条件更新防并发重放) */
@@ -267,23 +341,55 @@ export async function changePassword(
 
 // ── TOTP 管理 ──
 
-export function totpStatus(admin: AdminRow | null) {
-  return { enabled: !!admin?.totp_enabled_at, pending: !!admin?.totp_pending_secret_ref };
+export async function totpStatus(db: Kysely<DB>, admin: AdminRow | null): Promise<TotpStatus> {
+  const enabled = !!admin?.totp_enabled_at;
+  return {
+    enabled,
+    pending: !!admin?.totp_pending_secret_ref,
+    recoveryCodesRemaining: enabled && admin ? await remainingRecoveryCodes(db, admin.id) : 0,
+  };
 }
 
-export async function totpBegin(deps: AuthDeps, admin: AdminRow): Promise<{ uri: string; secret: string }> {
+export interface TotpSetupInfo {
+  uri: string;
+  secret: string;
+  issuer: string;
+  account: string;
+}
+
+function otpauthUri(secret: string, account: string): string {
+  const label = encodeURIComponent(`${TOTP_ISSUER}:${account}`);
+  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?secret=${secret}&issuer=${encodeURIComponent(TOTP_ISSUER)}&algorithm=SHA1&digits=6&period=30`;
+}
+
+export async function totpBegin(deps: AuthDeps, admin: AdminRow): Promise<TotpSetupInfo> {
   if (admin.totp_enabled_at) throw new ApiException("conflict", "TOTP 已启用,先停用再重新绑定");
   const secret = base32Encode(randomBytes(20));
   const ref = await deps.secrets.create({ purpose: "other", plaintext: secret, label: `admin-totp:${randomToken(6)}` });
   const old = admin.totp_pending_secret_ref;
   await deps.db.updateTable("admin_user").set({ totp_pending_secret_ref: ref }).where("id", "=", admin.id).execute();
   if (old) await deps.secrets.remove(old).catch(() => {});
-  const label = encodeURIComponent(`${TOTP_ISSUER}:${admin.username ?? "admin"}`);
-  const uri = `otpauth://totp/${label}?secret=${secret}&issuer=${encodeURIComponent(TOTP_ISSUER)}&algorithm=SHA1&digits=6&period=30`;
-  return { uri, secret };
+  const account = admin.username ?? "admin";
+  return { uri: otpauthUri(secret, account), secret, issuer: TOTP_ISSUER, account };
 }
 
-export async function totpEnable(deps: AuthDeps, admin: AdminRow, code: string): Promise<void> {
+/** GET /auth/totp/setup:已有未确认的密钥就原样返回(刷新页面不作废已扫的码),没有才生成 */
+export async function totpSetup(deps: AuthDeps, admin: AdminRow): Promise<TotpSetupInfo> {
+  if (admin.totp_enabled_at) throw new ApiException("conflict", "TOTP 已启用,先停用再重新绑定");
+  if (admin.totp_pending_secret_ref) {
+    try {
+      const secret = await deps.secrets.resolve(admin.totp_pending_secret_ref);
+      const account = admin.username ?? "admin";
+      return { uri: otpauthUri(secret, account), secret, issuer: TOTP_ISSUER, account };
+    } catch {
+      // 待确认密钥读不出来(被删 / 主密钥不匹配):重新生成
+    }
+  }
+  return totpBegin(deps, admin);
+}
+
+/** 确认开启;返回新生成的恢复码明文(只此一次) */
+export async function totpEnable(deps: AuthDeps, admin: AdminRow, code: string): Promise<string[]> {
   if (!admin.totp_pending_secret_ref) throw new ApiException("precondition_failed", "先生成 TOTP 密钥");
   const secret = await deps.secrets.resolve(admin.totp_pending_secret_ref);
   const counter = verifyTotp(secret, code, null);
@@ -300,6 +406,20 @@ export async function totpEnable(deps: AuthDeps, admin: AdminRow, code: string):
     .where("id", "=", admin.id)
     .execute();
   if (old) await deps.secrets.remove(old).catch(() => {});
+  return await regenerateRecoveryCodes(deps.db, admin.id);
+}
+
+/** 用当前密码重新生成恢复码(TOTP 必须已开启) */
+export async function totpRegenerateRecoveryCodes(
+  deps: AuthDeps,
+  admin: AdminRow,
+  input: { password: string },
+): Promise<string[]> {
+  if (!admin.totp_enabled_at) throw new ApiException("precondition_failed", "TOTP 未启用");
+  if (!admin.password_hash || !(await verifyPassword(input.password, admin.password_hash))) {
+    throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "密码错误");
+  }
+  return await regenerateRecoveryCodes(deps.db, admin.id);
 }
 
 export async function totpDisable(
@@ -311,13 +431,18 @@ export async function totpDisable(
   if (!admin.password_hash || !(await verifyPassword(input.password, admin.password_hash))) {
     throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "密码错误");
   }
-  if (!(await consumeTotp(deps, admin, input.code))) throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "验证码错误");
+  // 6 位数字按验证码校验,其余按恢复码(验证器丢了也能关)
+  const ok = /^\d{6}$/.test(input.code)
+    ? await consumeTotp(deps, admin, input.code)
+    : await consumeRecoveryCode(deps.db, admin.id, input.code);
+  if (!ok) throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "验证码错误");
   const ref = admin.totp_secret_ref;
   await deps.db
     .updateTable("admin_user")
     .set({ totp_secret_ref: null, totp_enabled_at: null, totp_last_counter: null })
     .where("id", "=", admin.id)
     .execute();
+  await deps.db.deleteFrom("admin_recovery_code").where("admin_user_id", "=", admin.id).execute();
   await deps.secrets.remove(ref).catch(() => {});
 }
 
@@ -333,5 +458,8 @@ export async function sessionInfo(
     actor: actor ?? null,
     expiresAt: expiresAt?.toISOString() ?? null,
     totpEnabled: !!admin?.totp_enabled_at,
+    passkeyEnabled: admin?.password_hash
+      ? !!(await db.selectFrom("admin_passkey").select("id").where("admin_user_id", "=", admin.id).executeTakeFirst())
+      : false,
   };
 }

apps/server/src/modules/auth-settings/passkey.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+import {
+  type AuthenticationResponseJSON,
+  type AuthenticatorTransportFuture,
+  generateAuthenticationOptions,
+  generateRegistrationOptions,
+  type RegistrationResponseJSON,
+  verifyAuthenticationResponse,
+  verifyRegistrationResponse,
+} from "@simplewebauthn/server";
+import type { PasskeyChallenge, PasskeyInfo } from "@umt/contracts";
+import { type AdminPasskeyRow, type DB, type Kysely, sql } from "@umt/db";
+import { ApiException } from "../../http/errors.ts";
+import type { AdminRow } from "./auth-service.ts";
+
+// Passkey(WebAuthn,照 uhd_doc src/server/admin-auth/passkey.ts):替代密码的第一因子,
+// 登录成功直接建会话(不再要求 TOTP)。@simplewebauthn/server 做两个 ceremony;
+// 挑战存 webauthn_challenge 表(一次性、5 分钟有效、条件更新消费),可以登记多把并命名。
+// RP ID 取配置 WEBAUTHN_RP_ID,不设时取请求主机名;来源取配置 WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS,不设时接受主机名属于 RP ID 的来源。
+
+export const CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+
+export interface RpInfo {
+  rpID: string;
+  rpName: string;
+  /** 配置的允许来源;null = 按 RP ID 校验客户端上报的来源 */
+  origins: string[] | null;
+}
+
+/** 由配置 + 请求主机名得到 RP 信息(纯函数,便于测试) */
+export function resolveRp(
+  cfg: { WEBAUTHN_RP_ID?: string | undefined; WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS?: string | undefined; WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME?: string },
+  requestHost: string | null | undefined,
+): RpInfo {
+  const host = (requestHost ?? "").split(",")[0]?.trim() ?? "";
+  const hostname = host
+    .replace(/:\d+$/, "")
+    .replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
+    .toLowerCase();
+  const rpID = cfg.WEBAUTHN_RP_ID?.trim().toLowerCase() || hostname || "localhost";
+  const origins = cfg.WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS
+    ? cfg.WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS.split(",")
+        .map((s) => s.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ""))
+        .filter(Boolean)
+    : null;
+  return { rpID, rpName: cfg.WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME ?? "UHD Media Tool", origins: origins?.length ? origins : null };
+}
+
+/** 客户端上报的来源(clientDataJSON.origin);没配置允许来源时,主机名必须等于 RP ID 或是它的子域 */
+function expectedOrigins(rp: RpInfo, response: { response?: { clientDataJSON?: unknown } }): string[] {
+  if (rp.origins) return rp.origins;
+  let origin = "";
+  try {
+    const raw = String(response.response?.clientDataJSON ?? "");
+    origin = String((JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, "base64url").toString("utf8")) as { origin?: unknown }).origin ?? "");
+  } catch {
+    throw new ApiException("bad_request", "Passkey 响应格式不正确");
+  }
+  let hostname = "";
+  try {
+    hostname = new URL(origin).hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();
+  } catch {
+    throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "Passkey 来源无效");
+  }
+  if (hostname !== rp.rpID && !hostname.endsWith(`.${rp.rpID}`))
+    throw new ApiException("unauthorized", `Passkey 来源 ${origin} 与站点 ${rp.rpID} 不符`);
+  return [origin];
+}
+
+// ── 挑战 ──
+
+async function saveChallenge(
+  db: Kysely<DB>,
+  purpose: "register" | "login",
+  challenge: string,
+  adminUserId: string | null,
+): Promise<string> {
+  // 顺手清理过期挑战
+  await db
+    .deleteFrom("webauthn_challenge")
+    .where("expires_at", "<", new Date(Date.now() - CHALLENGE_TTL_MS))
+    .execute();
+  const r = await db
+    .insertInto("webauthn_challenge")
+    .values({ purpose, challenge, admin_user_id: adminUserId, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + CHALLENGE_TTL_MS) })
+    .returning("id")
+    .executeTakeFirstOrThrow();
+  return r.id;
+}
+
+/** 取出并作废挑战(一次性);过期 / 用过 / 用途不符返回 null */
+async function takeChallenge(
+  db: Kysely<DB>,
+  id: string,
+  purpose: "register" | "login",
+  adminUserId: string | null,
+): Promise<string | null> {
+  let q = db
+    .updateTable("webauthn_challenge")
+    .set({ used_at: new Date() })
+    .where("id", "=", id)
+    .where("purpose", "=", purpose)
+    .where("used_at", "is", null)
+    .where("expires_at", ">", new Date());
+  if (adminUserId) q = q.where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId);
+  const r = await q.returning("challenge").executeTakeFirst();
+  return r?.challenge ?? null;
+}
+
+// ── 登记的 Passkey ──
+
+const transportsOf = (v: unknown): AuthenticatorTransportFuture[] =>
+  Array.isArray(v) ? (v.filter((x) => typeof x === "string") as AuthenticatorTransportFuture[]) : [];
+
+export function toPasskeyInfo(r: AdminPasskeyRow): PasskeyInfo {
+  return {
+    id: r.id,
+    name: r.name,
+    deviceType: r.device_type,
+    backedUp: r.backed_up,
+    createdAt: r.created_at.toISOString(),
+    lastUsedAt: r.last_used_at?.toISOString() ?? null,
+  };
+}
+
+export async function listPasskeys(db: Kysely<DB>, adminUserId: string): Promise<AdminPasskeyRow[]> {
+  return await db
+    .selectFrom("admin_passkey")
+    .selectAll()
+    .where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId)
+    .orderBy("created_at")
+    .execute();
+}
+
+export async function renamePasskey(db: Kysely<DB>, adminUserId: string, id: string, name: string) {
+  const r = await db
+    .updateTable("admin_passkey")
+    .set({ name: name.trim() })
+    .where("id", "=", id)
+    .where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId)
+    .returningAll()
+    .executeTakeFirst();
+  if (!r) throw new ApiException("not_found", "Passkey 不存在");
+  return r;
+}
+
+export async function deletePasskey(db: Kysely<DB>, adminUserId: string, id: string) {
+  const r = await db
+    .deleteFrom("admin_passkey")
+    .where("id", "=", id)
+    .where("admin_user_id", "=", adminUserId)
+    .returning(["id", "name"])
+    .executeTakeFirst();
+  if (!r) throw new ApiException("not_found", "Passkey 不存在");
+  return r;
+}
+
+// ── 注册(需要控制台会话) ──
+
+export async function registrationOptions(db: Kysely<DB>, admin: AdminRow, rp: RpInfo): Promise<PasskeyChallenge> {
+  const existing = await listPasskeys(db, admin.id);
+  const options = await generateRegistrationOptions({
+    rpName: rp.rpName,
+    rpID: rp.rpID,
+    userName: admin.username ?? "admin",
+    userID: new TextEncoder().encode(admin.id),
+    attestationType: "none",
+    excludeCredentials: existing.map((c) => ({ id: c.credential_id, transports: transportsOf(c.transports) })),
+    authenticatorSelection: { residentKey: "preferred", userVerification: "preferred" },
+  });
+  const challengeId = await saveChallenge(db, "register", options.challenge, admin.id);
+  return { challengeId, options: options as unknown as Record<string, unknown> };
+}
+
+export async function verifyRegistration(
+  db: Kysely<DB>,
+  admin: AdminRow,
+  rp: RpInfo,
+  input: { challengeId: string; name: string; response: Record<string, unknown> },
+): Promise<AdminPasskeyRow> {
+  const response = input.response as unknown as RegistrationResponseJSON;
+  const origins = expectedOrigins(rp, response);
+  const challenge = await takeChallenge(db, input.challengeId, "register", admin.id);
+  if (!challenge) throw new ApiException("precondition_failed", "注册挑战已过期或已用过,重新开始");
+  let v: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verifyRegistrationResponse>>;
+  try {
+    v = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
+      response,
+      expectedChallenge: challenge,
+      expectedOrigin: origins,
+      expectedRPID: rp.rpID,
+      requireUserVerification: false,
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new ApiException("unauthorized", `Passkey 校验失败:${(err as Error).message}`);
+  }
+  if (!v.verified) throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "Passkey 校验失败");
+  const { credential, credentialDeviceType, credentialBackedUp } = v.registrationInfo;
+  try {
+    return await db
+      .insertInto("admin_passkey")
+      .values({
+        admin_user_id: admin.id,
+        credential_id: credential.id,
+        public_key: Buffer.from(credential.publicKey),
+        counter: credential.counter,
+        transports: JSON.stringify(credential.transports ?? response.response?.transports ?? []),
+        device_type: credentialDeviceType,
+        backed_up: credentialBackedUp,
+        name: input.name.trim(),
+      })
+      .returningAll()
+      .executeTakeFirstOrThrow();
+  } catch (err) {
+    if ((err as { code?: string }).code === "23505") throw new ApiException("conflict", "这把 Passkey 已经登记过");
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+// ── 登录(免鉴权) ──
+
+export async function authenticationOptions(db: Kysely<DB>, admin: AdminRow, rp: RpInfo): Promise<PasskeyChallenge> {
+  const creds = await listPasskeys(db, admin.id);
+  if (!creds.length) throw new ApiException("precondition_failed", "还没有登记 Passkey,用密码登录");
+  const options = await generateAuthenticationOptions({
+    rpID: rp.rpID,
+    userVerification: "preferred",
+    allowCredentials: creds.map((c) => ({ id: c.credential_id, transports: transportsOf(c.transports) })),
+  });
+  const challengeId = await saveChallenge(db, "login", options.challenge, null);
+  return { challengeId, options: options as unknown as Record<string, unknown> };
+}
+
+/** 校验断言;成功后更新签名计数器与最近使用时间。失败抛 unauthorized / precondition_failed */
+export async function verifyAuthentication(
+  db: Kysely<DB>,
+  admin: AdminRow,
+  rp: RpInfo,
+  input: { challengeId: string; response: Record<string, unknown> },
+): Promise<AdminPasskeyRow> {
+  const response = input.response as unknown as AuthenticationResponseJSON;
+  const origins = expectedOrigins(rp, response);
+  const challenge = await takeChallenge(db, input.challengeId, "login", null);
+  if (!challenge) throw new ApiException("precondition_failed", "登录挑战已过期或已用过,重试");
+  const cred = await db
+    .selectFrom("admin_passkey")
+    .selectAll()
+    .where("admin_user_id", "=", admin.id)
+    .where("credential_id", "=", String(response.id ?? ""))
+    .executeTakeFirst();
+  if (!cred) throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "这把 Passkey 没有登记");
+  let v: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verifyAuthenticationResponse>>;
+  try {
+    v = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
+      response,
+      expectedChallenge: challenge,
+      expectedOrigin: origins,
+      expectedRPID: rp.rpID,
+      credential: {
+        id: cred.credential_id,
+        publicKey: new Uint8Array(cred.public_key),
+        counter: Number(cred.counter),
+        transports: transportsOf(cred.transports),
+      },
+      requireUserVerification: false,
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new ApiException("unauthorized", `Passkey 校验失败:${(err as Error).message}`);
+  }
+  if (!v.verified) throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "Passkey 校验失败");
+  // 计数器只增不减(条件更新:并发重放同一个断言只有一个生效;计数器恒为 0 的认证器照常放行)
+  const next = v.authenticationInfo.newCounter;
+  const u = await db
+    .updateTable("admin_passkey")
+    .set({
+      counter: next,
+      last_used_at: new Date(),
+      device_type: v.authenticationInfo.credentialDeviceType,
+      backed_up: v.authenticationInfo.credentialBackedUp,
+    })
+    .where("id", "=", cred.id)
+    .where(sql<boolean>`(counter < ${next} or (counter = 0 and ${next} = 0))`)
+    .returningAll()
+    .executeTakeFirst();
+  if (!u) throw new ApiException("unauthorized", "Passkey 签名计数器回退(可能被克隆),已拒绝");
+  return u;
+}

apps/server/src/modules/auth-settings/provided.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHmac, randomBytes, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import { DEFAULT_SETTINGS, GlobalSettings, type SecretPurpose, type SettingsKey } from "@umt/contracts";
 import type { DB, Kysely } from "@umt/db";
 import type { Logger } from "pino";
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import { deriveKey } from "./crypto.ts";
 
 export const SECRET_ALGORITHM = "aes-256-gcm";
 export const SECRET_KDF = "hkdf-sha256";
-/** 当前主密钥版本;轮换主密钥时 +1,并用 rewrapAll 重新加密 */
+/** 密文格式版本(HKDF info = umt/secret/v<版本>);主密钥轮换不改它,换哪把主密钥看 kdf_params.kid */
 export const SECRET_KEY_VERSION = 1;
 
 /** 找不到 secret 或无法解密;消息里只有 ref,不含任何明文 */
@@ -52,9 +52,14 @@ interface Sealed {
   ciphertext: Buffer;
   nonce: Buffer;
   authTag: Buffer;
-  kdfParams: { salt: string; info: string };
+  /** kid:主密钥指纹(HMAC 派生,不可逆),主密钥轮换时据此跳过已换过的行 */
+  kdfParams: { salt: string; info: string; kid: string };
 }
 
+/** 主密钥指纹:HMAC-SHA256(masterKey, 固定标签) 取前 16 位十六进制;只用于区分密钥,不能反推 */
+export const masterKeyId = (masterKey: string) =>
+  createHmac("sha256", Buffer.from(masterKey, "utf8")).update("umt/secret/kid").digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+
 /** AAD 绑定行 id 与用途:密文被挪到别的行/改用途即解密失败 */
 const UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
 function assertRef(ref: string) {
@@ -72,7 +77,12 @@ function seal(masterKey: string, id: string, purpose: string, plaintext: string)
   const cipher = createCipheriv(SECRET_ALGORITHM, key, nonce);
   cipher.setAAD(aad(id, purpose));
   const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
-  return { ciphertext, nonce, authTag: cipher.getAuthTag(), kdfParams: { salt: salt.toString("base64"), info } };
+  return {
+    ciphertext,
+    nonce,
+    authTag: cipher.getAuthTag(),
+    kdfParams: { salt: salt.toString("base64"), info, kid: masterKeyId(masterKey) },
+  };
 }
 
 function open(
@@ -188,6 +198,108 @@ export function createSecretStore(deps: { db: Kysely<DB>; masterKey: string }):
   };
 }
 
+// ── 主密钥轮换(--role rotate-master-key) ──
+
+export interface RotateMasterKeyResult {
+  total: number;
+  /** 本次用新密钥重新加密的行 */
+  rotated: number;
+  /** 已经是新密钥加密的行(上次中断后重跑时跳过) */
+  skipped: number;
+  /** 新旧密钥都解不开的行(id 列表;不改动) */
+  failed: string[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * 用新主密钥逐条重新加密 secret 表:每行一个事务(select … for update → 旧密钥解密 → 新盐新 nonce 加密 → 写回),
+ * 已能被新密钥解开的行跳过,所以中断后原样重跑即可(幂等);新旧密钥对调再跑一遍就是回滚。
+ * 明文只在单行事务内存里出现,不写日志。
+ */
+export async function rotateMasterKey(
+  deps: { db: Kysely<DB>; logger: Logger },
+  oldKey: string,
+  newKey: string,
+  opts: { progressEvery?: number } = {},
+): Promise<RotateMasterKeyResult> {
+  if (oldKey === newKey) throw new Error("新旧主密钥相同,不需要轮换");
+  const { db, logger } = deps;
+  const newKid = masterKeyId(newKey);
+  const every = opts.progressEvery ?? 50;
+  const ids = (await db.selectFrom("secret").select("id").orderBy("id").execute()).map((r) => r.id);
+  const out: RotateMasterKeyResult = { total: ids.length, rotated: 0, skipped: 0, failed: [] };
+  logger.info({ total: ids.length, newKeyId: newKid }, "主密钥轮换开始");
+  let done = 0;
+  for (const id of ids) {
+    const r = await db.transaction().execute(async (trx) => {
+      const row = await trx
+        .selectFrom("secret")
+        .select(["id", "purpose", "ciphertext", "nonce", "auth_tag", "kdf_params"])
+        .where("id", "=", id)
+        .forUpdate()
+        .executeTakeFirst();
+      if (!row) return "gone" as const;
+      const tryOpen = (key: string) => {
+        try {
+          return open(key, row);
+        } catch {
+          return null;
+        }
+      };
+      if (tryOpen(newKey) !== null) return "skipped" as const;
+      const plain = tryOpen(oldKey);
+      if (plain === null) return "failed" as const;
+      const sealed = seal(newKey, row.id, row.purpose, plain);
+      await trx
+        .updateTable("secret")
+        .set({
+          ciphertext: sealed.ciphertext,
+          nonce: sealed.nonce,
+          auth_tag: sealed.authTag,
+          kdf_params: JSON.stringify(sealed.kdfParams),
+          rotated_at: new Date(),
+        })
+        .where("id", "=", row.id)
+        .execute();
+      return "rotated" as const;
+    });
+    if (r === "rotated") out.rotated++;
+    else if (r === "skipped") out.skipped++;
+    else if (r === "failed") {
+      out.failed.push(id);
+      logger.warn({ secretId: id }, "这条 secret 新旧主密钥都解不开,已跳过(保持原样)");
+    }
+    done++;
+    if (done % every === 0 || done === ids.length)
+      logger.info(
+        { done, total: ids.length, rotated: out.rotated, skipped: out.skipped, failed: out.failed.length },
+        "主密钥轮换进度",
+      );
+  }
+  await db
+    .insertInto("audit_event")
+    .values({
+      actor_type: "system",
+      actor_id: "rotate-master-key",
+      action: "secret.master_key_rotate",
+      target_type: "secret",
+      target_id: null,
+      payload: JSON.stringify({
+        total: out.total,
+        rotated: out.rotated,
+        skipped: out.skipped,
+        failed: out.failed,
+        newKeyId: newKid,
+      }),
+    })
+    .execute()
+    .catch((err) => logger.warn({ err: { message: (err as Error).message } }, "主密钥轮换审计写入失败"));
+  logger.info(
+    { total: out.total, rotated: out.rotated, skipped: out.skipped, failed: out.failed.length },
+    out.failed.length ? "主密钥轮换结束,有解不开的行" : "主密钥轮换完成",
+  );
+  return out;
+}
+
 // ── 设置读取 ──
 
 /** SSE / 进程间广播的设置变更事件 */