fix(files,security): S-1 per-source Move authorization, S-2 session-only annotation, S-5 restore guards
S-1 (/files/move, /files/organize action=move): - organize-guard: authorizeMoveEntities checks every source's media entities (declared entity plus entities of registered assets under the source); one-time approval still covers the whole request; any source that cannot be attributed to an entity only passes with an approval; denial lists every unauthorized item; optional non-consuming pre-check - transfer: entities per source (directory = registered assets beneath it) - organize: all move groups pre-checked before any group executes; any denial -> whole request 403 approval_required S-2: - api.ts: GET /files/download and POST /files/trash/purge marked auth:"session"; files routes attach requireAdminSession from the registry annotation; handler-side purge check removed, download keeps a same-rule defense check; permanent delete uses isAdminSession - DEV key rule written down: equals an admin-scope key for session-only endpoints, still admin for Move/delete approval bypass (as authorizeMove) - api-registry.test: session list updated; new reverse assertion that no non-session endpoint answers 403 to an admin-scope bearer S-5 (trash restore): - restore-to requires a writable managed library root (isWritableTarget) - in-place restore rebuilds missing parents level by level without following symlinks (mkdirWithin), realpath-checked per level - cross-volume restore capped by FILES_TRASH_CROSS_MAX_BYTES; cross-volume copies (trash in / restore out) go through fsproxy Tests: multi-entity move 403 + listing, unattributed source, organize foreign asset 403, download/purge 403 for DEV and admin-scope keys, restore target not writable, symlinked parent, rebuild parents, cross-volume cap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
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import { appendFile, mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { createFmHarness, type FmHarness, key, pgAvailable, READ_KEY, seedAsset, seedEntity } from "./harness.ts";
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import {
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createFmHarness,
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EXEC_KEY,
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type FmHarness,
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key,
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pgAvailable,
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READ_KEY,
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seedAsset,
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seedEntity,
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} from "./harness.ts";
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// identify(只读,本地 + 远端召回前 5,不落库)、organize(按作品分组走 planImport,dryRun→execute 一致与源变更)、
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// probe(已登记写回 media_info)、scrape(仅已登记作品,入队 refreshMetadata;NFO 待 W5)。
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@@ -114,6 +123,42 @@ describe.skipIf(skip)("files 识别 / 整理 / 探测 / 刮削", () => {
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expect(rec).toEqual({ trigger: "manual", action: "copy", media_entity_id: film });
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});
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it("organize Move(验收 07 S-1):源是别的作品的已登记资产 → 只授权声明作品不够,整体 403 并列出", async () => {
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const other = await seedEntity(h.db, { kind: "movie", title: "Other Film", year: 2020 });
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await mkdir(join(h.lib, "Stolen"), { recursive: true });
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await writeFile(join(h.lib, "Stolen", "Blue.Film.2021.2160p.BluRay.x265-GRP.mkv"), "someone-else");
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await seedAsset(h.db, h, { entityId: other, rel: "Stolen/Blue.Film.2021.2160p.BluRay.x265-GRP.mkv" });
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const grant = await h.db
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.insertInto("automation_grant")
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.values({ action: "organize.execute", scope: JSON.stringify({ mediaEntityIds: [film] }), granted_by: "test" })
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.returning("id")
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.executeTakeFirstOrThrow();
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const items = [{ root: h.libRoot, path: "Stolen/Blue.Film.2021.2160p.BluRay.x265-GRP.mkv", mediaEntityId: film }];
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const dry = await h.api(
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"POST",
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"/files/organize",
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{ idempotencyKey: key(), items, action: "move", dryRun: true },
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EXEC_KEY,
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);
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expect(dry.status).toBe(200);
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const r = await h.api(
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"POST",
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"/files/organize",
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{ idempotencyKey: key(), items, action: "move", dryRun: false, planIds: [dry.body.data.groups[0].planId] },
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EXEC_KEY,
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);
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expect(r.status).toBe(403);
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expect(r.body.error.message).toMatch(/^approval_required:/);
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expect(r.body.error.message).toContain(other);
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const recs = await h.db
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.selectFrom("organization_record")
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.select("id")
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.where("source_path", "like", "%Stolen%")
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.execute();
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expect(recs).toEqual([]);
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await h.db.updateTable("automation_grant").set({ status: "revoked" }).where("id", "=", grant.id).execute();
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});
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it("organize:路径逃逸同样拒绝", async () => {
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const r = await h.api("POST", "/files/organize", {
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idempotencyKey: key(),
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